The Military Conquest of the Prairie is a study on the final wars on the prairie from the Native American perspective. When the reservation system took hold about one-third of tribes stayed permanently there, one-third during the harsh winter months, and the last third remained on what the government termed unceded territory, which Native Americans had the right to occupy by treaty. For the Federal government it was completely unacceptable that some Indians refused to submit to its authority. Both the Red River war (1874-75) in the south and the great Sioux war (1876-77 ) in the north were the direct result of Federal violation of treaties and agreements. At issue was the one-sided violence against free roaming tribes that were trying to maintain their old way of life, at the heart of which was avoidance on intermingling with white men. Contrary to the expectations of the government, and indeed to most historical accounts, the Native Americans were winning on the battlefields with clear conceptions of strategy and tactics. They only laid down their arms when their reservation was secured on their homeland, thus providing their preferred living space and enabling them to continue their way of life in security. But white man perfidy and governmental double-cross were the order of the day. The Federal government found it intolerable that what it termed savages' should be able to determine their own future. Vicious attacks were initiated in order to stamp out tribalism, resulting in driving the US aboriginal population almost to extinction. Analysis of these events is discussed in light of the passing of the Dawes Act in 1887 that provided for breaking up the reservations to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 that gave a semblance of justice to Native Americans.

When the British Labour party announced the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in January 1968, the United States faced a potential power vacuum in the area. The incoming Nixon administration, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and China, and the war in Vietnam, had no intention of replacing the British in the Gulf. To avoid further military commitments, the US encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain area security. A critical policy decision, overlooked by most scholars, saw Nixon and Kissinger engineer the rise in oil prices between 1969 and 1972 to enable Saudi Arabia and Iran to purchase the necessary military hardware to serve as guardians of the Gulf. For all their bluster about reversing Labours withdrawal decision, after their surprise victory in the election of June 1970 the Conservatives adhered to Labours policy. But in contrast to Labours wish to cut the umbilical cord of empire, the Tories wanted to retain influence in the Persian Gulf, pursuing policies largely independent of the US by the creation of the United Arab Emirates, deposing the sultan of Oman, and trying to solve the dispute over the Buraimi oasis with Saudi Arabia. By trying to maintain its empire on the cheap, Britain turned into an arms supplier supreme. But offering and selling arms does not a foreign policy make, leaving Britain in the long run with less influence in regional affairs. This was true also for the US, whose arms sales were to prove no realistic an alternative to foreign policy. The US hid under the Iranian security blanket for almost a decade. Given the weakness of the regime and the Shahs nonsensical dreams of turning Iran into one of the top five industrial and military powers in the world, the policy was cavalierly irresponsible. Similarly, leaving Saudi Arabia wallowing in oil money and medieval stupor a seedbed for Islamic fundamentalists created major future problems for the United States, as evinced by 9/11.

The Military Conquest of the Prairie is a study on the final wars on the prairie from the Native American perspective. When the reservation system took hold about one-third of tribes stayed permanently there, one-third during the harsh winter months, and the last third remained on what the government termed unceded territory, which Native Americans had the right to occupy by treaty. For the Federal government it was completely unacceptable that some Indians refused to submit to its authority. Both the Red River war (1874-75) in the south and the great Sioux war (1876-77 ) in the north were the direct result of Federal violation of treaties and agreements. At issue was the one-sided violence against free roaming tribes that were trying to maintain their old way of life, at the heart of which was avoidance on intermingling with white men. Contrary to the expectations of the government, and indeed to most historical accounts, the Native Americans were winning on the battlefields with clear conceptions of strategy and tactics. They only laid down their arms when their reservation was secured on their homeland, thus providing their preferred living space and enabling them to continue their way of life in security. But white man perfidy and governmental double-cross were the order of the day. The Federal government found it intolerable that what it termed savages' should be able to determine their own future. Vicious attacks were initiated in order to stamp out tribalism, resulting in driving the US aboriginal population almost to extinction. Analysis of these events is discussed in light of the passing of the Dawes Act in 1887 that provided for breaking up the reservations to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 that gave a semblance of justice to Native Americans.

Discusses Anglo-American policy in the Middle East under Kennedy and Johnson, as well as under British Conservative and Labour governments; Provides a historical background on the Anglo-American Middle East for the 1950s; Analyses Western policy toward Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and toward the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The author provides an extensive study of the common British and American interest in the Middle East (hence the term Anglo-American Middle East) under Kennedy and Johnson. Contrary to recent scholarly opinion, the author argues that the loss of influence to the Soviet Union and Arab radicalism in the Middle East was not the result of lack of power but lack of will. Britain, during the period of Harold Wilson's Labour government (1964-1970) withdrew from its Middle Eastern bases for ideological reasons, namely a distaste for imperialism and colonialism. The United States, while placing great store in a continued British presence east of Suez, was unable or unwilling to prevent the British withdrawal. And as the British withdrawal gathered momentum, American disinterest toward the Middle East increased.

For over sixty years the state of Israel has proved adept at practising clandestine diplomacy - - about which little is known, as one might expect. These hitherto undisclosed episodes in Israel's diplomatic history are revealed for the first time by the contributors to this volume, who explore how relations based upon patronage and personal friendships, as well as ties born from kinship and realpolitik both informed the creation of the state and later defined Israel's relations with a host of actors, both state and non-state. The authors focus on the extent to which Israel's clandestine diplomacies have indeed been regarded as purely functional and sub- ordinate to a realist quest for security amid the perceived hostility of a predominantly Muslim-Arab world, or have in fact proved to be manifestations of a wider acceptance - political, social and cultural - of a Jewish sovereign state as an intrinsic part of the Middle East. They also discuss whether clandestine diplomacy has been more effective in securing Israeli objectives than reliance upon more formal diplomatic ties constrained by inter- national legal obligations and how this often complex and at times contradictory matrix of clandestine relationships continues to influence perceptions of Israel's foreign policy.

The Norwegian University of Science and Technology hosted a conference on the Anglo-American Middle East in Trondheim 2 to 4 May 2005. A distinguished group of scholars accepted our invitations and gracefully agreed to rewrite their lectures for inclusion in this book. They also easily transcended the, perhaps, narrow theme of the conference, making their papers a sophisticated discussion, by and large, how the different great powers have, not always successfully, tried to control the Middle East. Hence the title of this book, "Controlling the Uncontrollable". Edward Ingram compares with a grand sweep the British and the American imperial experience in the Middle East, he notes that too many scholars exaggerate the power of nineteenth-century Great Britain in order to compare it with the present day 'US paramountcy'. Alan Milward is on a different tack, explaining how the oil crisis and oil embargo forced the European Common Market to take a new approach towards the Arabs, in the process cutting loose from the American embrace and laying the foundation for a common EU foreign policy. In his article, Douglas Little deepens our understanding of his concept American Orientalism - the tendency to dismiss Muslims as backward, decadent and evil - ending his essay with a withering criticism of George W Bush who has rejected the doctrine of containment in favour of preventive war when invading Iraq, needlessly creating the current imbroglio there. Peter Hahn discusses American-Israeli relations in the period 1945-1961, showing that Israeli and American officials were often at loggerheads on the future of the Jewish state. Rounding off the essays is Mary Ann Heiss' account of key episodes of American oil policy since 1945. Even with the importance of oil, as Heiss explains, the balance of power had by 1974 shifted in favour of the oil producers; that had 'shrewdly divided the Atlantic Alliance, pitting the Western Europeans against both the Americans and each other'.

When the British Labour party announced the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in January 1968, the United States faced a potential power vacuum in the area. The incoming Nixon administration, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and China, and the war in Vietnam, had no intention of replacing the British in the Gulf. To avoid further military commitments, the US encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain area security. A critical policy decision, overlooked by most scholars, saw Nixon and Kissinger engineer the rise in oil prices between 1969 and 1972 to enable Saudi Arabia and Iran to purchase the necessary military hardware to serve as guardians of the Gulf. For all their bluster about reversing Labour's withdrawal decision, after their surprise victory in the election of June 1970 the Conservatives adhered to Labour's policy. But in contrast to Labour's wish to cut the umbilical cord of empire, the Tories wanted to retain influence in the Persian Gulf, pursuing policies largely independent of the US by the creation of the United Arab Emirates, deposing the sultan of Oman, and trying to solve the dispute over the Buraimi oasis with Saudi Arabia. By trying to maintain its empire on the cheap, Britain turned into an arms supplier supreme. But offering and selling arms does not a foreign policy make, leaving Britain in the long run with less influence in regional affairs. This was true also for the US, whose arms sales were to prove no realistic an alternative to foreign policy. The US hid under the Iranian security blanket for almost a decade. Given the weakness of the regime and the Shah's nonsensical dreams of turning Iran into one of the top five industrial and military powers in the world, the policy was cavalierly irresponsible. Similarly, leaving Saudi Arabia wallowing in oil money and medieval stupor -- a seedbed for Islamic fundamentalists -- created major future problems for the United States, as evinced by 9/11.

Discusses Anglo-American policy in the Middle East under Kennedy and Johnson, as well as under British Conservative and Labour governments; Provides a historical background on the Anglo-American Middle East for the 1950s; Analyses Western policy toward Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and toward the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The author provides an extensive study of the common British and American interest in the Middle East (hence the term Anglo-American Middle East) under Kennedy and Johnson. Contrary to recent scholarly opinion, the author argues that the loss of influence to the Soviet Union and Arab radicalism in the Middle East was not the result of lack of power but lack of will. Britain, during the period of Harold Wilson's Labour government (1964-1970) withdrew from its Middle Eastern bases for ideological reasons, namely a distaste for imperialism and colonialism. The United States, while placing great store in a continued British presence east of Suez, was unable or unwilling to prevent the British withdrawal. And as the British withdrawal gathered momentum, American disinterest toward the Middle East increased.

What to make of the British and American experience in the Middle East? Simon Smith compares British and American foreign policy in the Far East and the Persian Gulf, explaining that the Anglo-American relationship was far from harmonious. Both powers tried manipulate the other to its own advantage. While Washington was clearly the stronger power, London, as Simon Smith argues, was never reduced to subservience. Michael Thornhill demonstrates by contrast that even during the height of imperial British influence in the Middle East it was never easy for Britain to always manipulate events for its own benefit. By examining the often neglected role of king Farouk, Thornhill argues that Egypt was forced to contend with 'an imperial power which could, at a few hours notice, overwhelm or undermine Egypt's supposed sovereign institutions'. Withdrawing support from king Farouk 'while still having 80,000 troops three hours drive away from Cairo-amounted to intervention by other means', may have had the short term benefits for the British, but in turn, London was unwilling or unable to prevent Gamal Abdul Nasser and his revolutionary officers from seizing power in 1952. While London perhaps mishandled the transfer of power in Egypt, by contrast Clea Bunch points out how the British managed the transition from being the dominant power in Jordan to preserving a substantial influence by inviting American participation in securing regime legitimacy. 'In the end, American dollars supported the Hashemite regime while British influence remained, just as British officials wished.' James Worrall argues that by the mid 1970s there was an Anglo-American understanding 'that the Northern Gulf was America's responsibility and that the southern Gulf was Britain's.' Clive Jones examines how intelligence and clandestine operations were used and abused by the British in pursuit of their strategic interests, first somewhat unsuccessfully in Yemen in the 1960s, but with more tangible success in Oman in the 1970s.